

PRESENTED BY UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON

TAMEST NATURAL HAZARDS SUMMIT

*Responding
to and
Mitigating
the Impacts*

PART I: VIRTUAL SUMMIT

10.19.2021

#NATURALHAZARDSSUMMIT

Theme Four:

ENGINEERING AND DESIGNING FOR RESILIENCE

Moderated by:
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**John and Rebecca Moores Professor of Civil
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Panel:

Engineering and Designing for Resilience



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Assistant Professor
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JULIE SHIYOU-
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**President and
CEO**
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The need for cyber-resilience in critical infrastructure

- **Successful attacks** are becoming more frequent
 - Stuxnet (2010), Dragonfly/Energetic Bear, Black energy (Ukraine 2015), Crashoverride (Ukraine 2016), Florida water system hack (February 2021), Colonial Pipeline (May 2021)
- **Perimeter defenses** are **not sufficient** against determined attackers



The need for cyber-resilience in critical infrastructure

- **Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)** systems form the backbone of critical infrastructure services
- Must be **constantly available** and running at **expected level of performance** (able to react within 100-200ms)
- Failures and downtime can cause **catastrophic consequences**, such as equipment damage, blackouts, and human casualties **and they are a target for attackers today**




Intrusion Tolerance: an approach for resilience

- **Intrusion tolerance** is the ability to continue to operate **correctly**, and at an **expected level of performance**, despite attacks that **succeed in compromising part of the system**




Spire: Intrusion Tolerant SCADA for the Power Grid






Continues to work correctly (and meet performance guarantees) even if some critical components have been **compromised**

What about the network?




- SCADA systems for **wide-area transmission systems** support large power grids with PLCs in many substations spanning hundreds of miles
- What happens if the control center is disconnected?

What about the network?



Remaining challenges

- How can we make this easy for power grid operators to deploy?
- Our recent work shows how we can **offload** management of part of the system **to cloud providers**, even if we don't fully trust them with our data!



Remaining challenges

- Is this threat model enough?
- Unfortunately, probably not...our ongoing work is investigating **compound threats** (natural disaster + follow-on cyberattacks)

